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PURSUING A SINGLE MISSION (OR
SOMETHING CLOSER TO IT) FOR THE IRS
Kristin E. Hickman*

Abstract
It is often said that taxes are the lifeblood of government. As the nation’s tax
collector, the IRS serves a critical function without which the federal government would
cease to function. Yet the IRS is an agency in crisis—mired in scandal, chronically
underfunded, overreliant on automation, and failing to provide taxpayers with the
support they need to comply with the tax laws and pay their taxes. This Essay argues that
a major contributor to the IRS’s woes is Congress’s penchant in recent decades for
utilizing the IRS to administer social welfare and regulatory programs that are only
tangentially related to the IRS’s traditional revenue raising mission. This Essay
examines the consequences of that choice and calls for reforming the IRS’s
organizational structure to segregate the revenue collection function from the biggest
and most politically fraught social welfare and regulatory programs that currently fall
within the IRS’s jurisdiction. To that end, this Essay suggests giving serious
consideration either to spinning off several non-revenue raising programs from IRS
oversight or to splitting up the IRS altogether and distributing its many functions among
other new or existing agencies.
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The code of the organization may be supposed governed most strongly
by its primary functions. But an organization has in general many
functions, auxiliary indeed to its primary ones but important to its
welfare. Alternatively, it may be thought desirable to add some
secondary functions to the organization because their accomplishment
appears to be complementary to the primary ones. But if the code
appropriate to the primary functions is inappropriate to the auxiliary or
1
secondary functions, the organization may function badly.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) serves an incredibly important function as an
agency of the federal government—that of collecting taxes and enforcing the tax laws.
The IRS has been described as “the federal government’s accounts receivable
department.”2 Without the tax revenues the IRS collects, the federal government would
quickly cease to function.
Yet the IRS is struggling. In her 2013 Annual Report to Congress, National
Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson described an IRS in crisis—mired in scandal, chronically
underfunded, overreliant on automation, and “entrenched in unproductive methods that
do not promote voluntary compliance.” 3 In her 2014 Annual Report, Olson again
emphasized the IRS’s difficulties, this time highlighting the “declining quality” of
taxpayer services provided by the IRS as “the most serious problem” faced by taxpayers,
and expressing concerns about the potential impact on taxpayer compliance.4
The IRS’s revenue collection function is no easy task, and the IRS takes that
mission seriously and generally handles it well. In its fiscal year 2014, the IRS collected
more than $3 trillion in taxes.5 In collecting that revenue, the IRS processed more than
240 million tax returns and supplemental documents—and even that large number does
not include all of the forms and returns the IRS handles, like W-2s and 1099s.6
IRS revenue raising efforts depend heavily on voluntary compliance by
taxpayers.7 Again, historically, the IRS has fared pretty well in this regard. More than
98% of the taxes that the IRS actually collects are paid voluntarily and on time.8 Of
course, taxes collected are not synonymous with taxes owed. In 2012, using data from
earlier years, the IRS estimated a pre-enforcement (i.e., voluntary) compliance rate of
1

KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 57 (1974).
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2013 ANN. REP. TO CONG. vol. 1, at xiii–xx (2013), http://www
.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/6733-QX98].
3
Id.
4
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2014 ANN. REP. TO CONG. vol. 1, at 3–25 (2014), http://www
.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-Annual-Report/Volume-One.pdf [https://perma.cc
/A53M-A3GC] [hereinafter NTA 2014 ANN. REP.].
5
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK, 2014, at 3 (2015), http://www
.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.pdf [http://perma.cc/U7N6-VDUX].
6
Id. at 4–5.
7
See, e.g., George O’Hanlon, The Role of the Internal Revenue Agent Then and Now, FED. BAR
ASS’N. SEC. ON TAX’N REP., Winter 1993, at 1 (describing voluntary compliance as “the cornerstone of the tax
system”). But see Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (suggesting that the
description of the U.S. tax system as “voluntary” is not entirely accurate).
8
NINA OLSON, NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., FISCAL YEAR 2016 OBJECTIVES REP. TO CONG. vol. 1, at
2 (2015), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-JRC/Volume_1.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TS7Y-PPSP].
2
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83.1%, yielding a gross tax gap of $450 billion.9 IRS enforcement efforts increased that
compliance rate only slightly, to 85.5%.10 Nevertheless, these statistics demonstrate that,
whether motivated by a citizen’s desire to contribute or by fear of the tax man, most
people in the United States file their tax returns and pay their taxes. Not every country is
so fortunate; the specter of Greece—with a shadow economy representing approximately
27% of GDP and collections of assessed taxes running less than 12%11—looms in the
background as an example to avoid.
The Internal Revenue Code is increasingly complicated. To help taxpayers in
their efforts to prepare their tax returns and comply with the tax laws, the IRS in Fiscal
Year 2014 answered more than 100 million phone calls and assisted more than 5 million
taxpayers at more than 300 taxpayer assistance centers across the country. 12 And,
concerned about even a roughly 15% tax gap, the IRS in the past has tried various
strategies to increase voluntary compliance, including improving its computer systems,
hiring a higher quality and more diverse workforce, and providing better training for its
agents. 13 Yet, as Olson and others have documented, budget cuts have reduced IRS
employee training and diminished taxpayer service,14 as well as curtailing funds and the
number of IRS employees available for enforcement efforts.15
To Olson’s litany of the IRS’s woes, I would add the following: the IRS is
stretched too thinly across multiple missions that are in tension with one another. As I
have documented in prior work, as the administrator of an increasingly-complex Internal
Revenue Code, the IRS has moved far beyond its original and primary mission as the
nation’s tax collector to become a multi-mission or omnibus agency, serving a variety of
congressional programs and goals that are arguably in tension with one another.16 To that
observation, I will add that many if not most of the political controversies that have
battered the IRS’s reputation in recent years have concerned social welfare or regulatory

9

IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; Compliance Rates Remain Statistically Unchanged from
Previous Study, IR-2012-4, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-ReleasesNew-Tax-Gap-Estimates;-Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-Unchanged-From-Previous-Study [http://
perma.cc/XZN4-VSXQ].
10
Id.
11
INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REP. NO. 13/155, GREECE: SELECTED ISSUES 18–27
(2013) (documenting Greece’s abysmal rate of tax compliance).
12
See NTA 2014 ANN. REP., supra note 4, at xvii.
13
O’Hanlon, supra note 7.
14
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2013 ANN. REP. TO CONG. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: PREFACE AND
HIGHLIGHTS, at 23–24 (2013), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/2013Annual-Report-to-Congress-Executive-Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/WDW2-PBS9]; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-534R, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: ABSORBING BUDGET CUTS HAS
RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT STAFFING DECLINES AND UNEVEN PERFORMANCE 8–9 (2014), http://www.gao.gov
/assets/670/662681.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9ER-49RE] [hereinafter GAO IRS BUDGET CUTS REP.] (showing
budget cuts both generally and as allocated among enforcement functions, taxpayer services, and operations
support and business system modernization).
15
GAO IRS BUDGET CUTS REP., supra note 14, at 8–9, (documenting that budget cuts have fallen
mostly on IRS enforcement functions and that the number of IRS full-time employees has declined as well,
both generally and with respect to enforcement functions). While many government agencies have reduced
their workforces through outsourcing, the IRS is not among them. See, e.g., Letter from Nina Olson,
National Taxpayer Advocate, to Cong., at 4–5 (May 13, 2014), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov
/userfiles/file/NTA_PDC_letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/7EA4-5GEQ] (documenting past failed efforts to
privatize certain collection functions).
16
Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717 (2014).
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programs and functions with only a tangential relationship to taxation, rather than
traditional revenue raising.17
Congress may be willing to trade some reduction in the IRS’s revenue raising
efforts to accomplish other goals efficiently. Congress also may be willing to trade some
reduction in the efficacy of social welfare or regulatory programs for the convenience of
utilizing the IRS’s existing administrative structure. My argument in this Essay,
however, is that Congress’s repeated utilization of the IRS to serve functions beyond its
traditional revenue raising mission has reached a tipping point that threatens to
undermine substantially the viability of the IRS’s primary mission as the nation’s tax
collector.
Tax scholars and policy makers sometimes talk about simplifying the tax code,
both in general18 and as a key element of solving the IRS’s problems.19 But, as a general
matter, Congress is not likely to stop using the tax code to achieve policy goals other than
revenue raising—and, indeed, often has very good reasons for doing so. Nor is Congress
likely to fully restore the IRS’s budget anytime soon (let alone provide appropriations
beyond said restoration). Beyond those obvious but unlikely solutions to the IRS’s woes,
existing reform proposals often seem like so much tinkering around the edges, akin to
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
My objective with this Essay is not to offer a detailed blueprint for IRS reform.
Instead, as a potential solution to at least some of the IRS’s present difficulties, this Essay
takes seriously a suggestion that, when advanced by certain politicians or pundits, 20
strikes many tax experts as hopelessly naïve and unworkable if not simply crazy: abolish
the IRS—perhaps not precisely as the politicians or pundits intend, but closely enough,
either by spinning off certain programs from direct IRS oversight or, though less likely,
by splitting up the IRS and distributing its many functions among other new or existing
agencies. The key notion behind this sort of fundamental restructuring is to segregate the
revenue collection function from the biggest and most politically fraught social welfare
and regulatory programs that currently fall within the IRS’s jurisdiction. The most
obvious candidates for separate administration are exempt organization status
determinations and monitoring, health care and pension matters that fall within the scope
17

See discussion infra Part III.
Tax simplification has been a topic of academic discussion for decades. For just a few examples
of that vast literature, see generally Joseph M. Dodge, Some Income Tax Simplification Proposals, 41 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 71 (2013) (outlining goals and proposals for simplification); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy
Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267 (analyzing different goals and definitions of tax
simplicity). For an example of policymaker proposals for tax simplification, see PERAB Tax Reform Tax
Force Releases Final Report, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 167-50 (Aug. 30, 2010) (identifying tax simplification
as a goal and documenting proposals of President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board to simplify the tax
system).
19
See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue Service
Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725, 772–79, 782–88 (2015) (identifying tax system complexity as one of the IRS’s
problems and proposing simplification as the first of several solutions); Koskinen Speaks In Favor of Tax
Simplification, IRS Transparency, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 241-83 (Dec. 16, 2013) (documenting IRS
Commissioner’s support for tax simplification).
20
See, e.g., Jerry Moran, Editorial, Overhaul Tax Code, Abolish IRS, USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2016)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/04/14/sen-moran-overhaul-tax-code-abolish-irs/83050708/
[https://perma.cc/D7FY-FBRQ](“Instead of spending millions in an attempt to fix the IRS, we should abolish
the agency through comprehensive tax reform.”); The Simple Flat Tax Plan, TEDCRUZ.ORG www.tedcruz.org
/tax_plan/ [https://perma.cc/M9UA-YC72] (describing presidential candidate Ted Cruz’s tax reform proposal
as including “abolish[ing] the IRS”).
18
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of ERISA and the Affordable Care Act, and eligibility for social welfare payments such
as the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. Obviously, the devil is in the
details, which I cannot offer here. Nevertheless, although lacking that precise blueprint,
this Essay offers preliminary thoughts as to why proposals to break up the IRS ought to
be given serious consideration.
II.
THE MODERN, MULTI-MISSION IRS
The Internal Revenue Code has always reflected goals beyond revenue raising,
and IRS administration of the tax laws has necessarily followed suit. Historical evidence
suggests that Congress enacted the corporate income tax not only to raise revenue but
also to provide a mechanism by which the government could regulate corporate activity
21
and constrain corporate political power.
The progressive structure of the individual
22
income tax is frequently justified at least partly as a remedy for societal inequality.
23
Combating inequality is also a justification for maintaining the estate tax.
The
government has subsidized home ownership through mortgage interest deductions and
charitable organizations through exemption from the corporate income tax since 1913,
although both the details and our thinking about these provisions have changed
substantially over the decades. Whereas both items were once considered definitional,
policymakers now acknowledge them as tax expenditures, and tax expenditures as
24
government spending.
Nevertheless, the legislative trend for several decades now has been to fold a
variety of other governmental programs into the tax system, and thus to put the IRS in
charge of administering them. The growth of tax expenditures is one part of this trend.
Although the precise definition of what constitutes a tax expenditure is elusive, generally
speaking, tax expenditures represent government spending that just happens to be
structured in the form of exclusions, exemptions, or deductions that reduce taxable
income or as credits that reduce the amount of taxes owed and that, in some instances, are
25
refundable.
Regardless of how one chooses to define what is or is not a tax
expenditure, there is no question that Congress has expanded their use. Not long after
26
Stanley Surrey coined the tax expenditures term in the 1960s, the federal tax
expenditure budget listed sixty items totaling somewhere between $60 billion and $65
21
STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME
TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 43–44 (2010); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense
of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1217–20 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation
and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
22
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM IN
FISCAL POLICY 15–19 (1938); Meredith R. Conway, Money, It’s a Crime. Share It Fairly, but Don’t Take a
Slice of My Pie!: The Legislative Case for the Progressive Income Tax, 39 J. LEGIS. 119, 130–32 (2013).
23
See generally Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to
Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013) (invoking societal inequality as
a rationale for retaining the estate tax); Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and
Gift Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 882 (2010) (recognizing societal inequality as one justification for
adopting the estate tax).
24
See Hickman, supra note 16, at 1727–28, 1733–35 (summarizing home mortgage interest
deduction and charitable exemption history).
25
See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018 2–3 (2014), http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663
[http://perma.cc/3K7L-8MR9] (describing tax expenditures and analogizing them to direct spending
programs).
26
See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM vii (1973).
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27

billion.
By comparison, a compendium of tax expenditures prepared by the
Congressional Research Service in 2012 lists two hundred and fifty such items totaling
28
well over $1 trillion,
and even that extensive list does not purport to be
29
comprehensive. Former Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff Edward Kleinbard
has called tax expenditures “the dominant instruments for implementing new
30
discretionary spending policies.” Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy Pamela Olson has elaborated further that
The continual enactment of targeted tax provisions leaves the
IRS with responsibility for the administration of policies aimed at the
environment, conservation, green energy, manufacturing, innovation,
education, saving, retirement, health care, child care, welfare, corporate
governance, export promotion, charitable giving, governance of tax
31
exempt organizations, and economic development, to name a few.
Administering government spending through the tax code is really the tip of the
iceberg of IRS involvement in programs and goals that are only tangentially associated
with revenue raising.32 For example, Congress increasingly utilizes refundable tax credits
rather than direct subsidies to alleviate poverty and support working families.33 Amounts
expended by the government on the earned income tax credit (EITC) and the child tax
credit each surpassed those for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and its
predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, years ago.34 In other words, the
IRS is now one of the government’s principal welfare agencies, on par with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Social Security
Administration. Some academics tout tax credits and IRS administration thereof as a
particularly efficient means of accomplishing congressional social welfare goals.35 Other
27

Id. at 7–11.
S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND
MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 1, 11 (Comm. Print. 2012) (Cong. Research Serv.) [hereinafter 2012
CRS COMPENDIUM].
29
The CRS Compendium draws its data from tax expenditure estimates compiled by the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT). Id. at 1. The JCT, in turn, acknowledges that it does not include de minimis
items that fall below $50 million or items for which quantification is unavailable. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAX’N, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015 27–30 (2012),
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4386 [http://perma.cc/SPC7-MPX4].
30
Edward D. Kleinbard, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: The Congress Within the Congress: How
Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
31
Pamela F. Olson, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: And Then Cnut Told Reagan . . . Lessons from
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2011) (citations omitted).
32
See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S.
Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 67 (2013) (“For the past twenty-five years, Congress has been
relying increasingly on the tax code to accomplish goals beyond raising revenue.”).
33
See Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173, 1180–84 (2013)
(describing the history of the EITC as a mechanism for alleviating poverty); Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those
Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those Who Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and
Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 113, 120–23 (2013) (discussing the history of refundable credits
with examples); see also EITC & Other Refundable Credits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.eitc.irs
.gov [http://perma.cc/UK5U-94Q6] (highlighting and facilitating claims to the EITC and other refundable tax
credits).
34
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2009 ANN. REP. TO CONG. vol. 2, at 78
(2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/09_tas_arc_vol_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/T737-QYP6].
35
See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867 (2005).
28
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scholars have documented administrative challenges posed by this arrangement, given the
complexity of the statutory requirements as well as the IRS’s lack of affinity for or
expertise regarding anti-poverty policies and objectives. 36 It is no secret among tax
experts that tax returns claiming such benefits are among the most likely to be audited,
largely due to IRS studies documenting high error rates (or high rates of fraud, depending
on one’s perspective) in claiming such benefits. 37 In past years, the IRS has been
criticized extensively for allegedly over-auditing the tax returns of benefits claimants.38
The newest big refundable tax credit is the subsidy for health insurance
premiums adopted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).39
Enacted in 2010, 40 the ACA is a complicated and lengthy piece of legislation that
endeavors to expand health insurance coverage and control health care costs through
various mandates, regulations, and subsidies administered by a combination of federal
and state agencies.41 The ACA contains several excise taxes that the IRS must collect.42
Individual income tax returns serve as the mechanism by which taxpayers also report
their compliance with the ACA’s requirement that they purchase health insurance, and
the IRS correspondingly relies upon those returns to determine and assess “shared
responsibility payments” (i.e., the penalties for failing to acquire health insurance).43 But
the legislation’s core aims are health care access and cost control, and the IRS’s role in
ACA implementation extends far beyond revenue collection. Working with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Labor (Labor),
IRS personnel have drafted regulations that, among other things, accommodate religious
organizations that object to mandatory contraceptive coverage;44 elaborate the extent to
which group health plans are precluded from denying coverage to individuals with
preexisting health conditions;45 and identify ways in which health insurance providers
36
See Drumbl, supra note 33, at 132-39 (2013) (describing at length the mismatch between the
IRS’s usual approach to tax enforcement and the needs and challenges of credit recipients).
37
See, e.g., Stephen D. Holt, Keeping It In Context: Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance and
Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183, 185–96 (2007) (documenting EITC error and
audit rates, and IRS and public perceptions regarding error versus fraud in that area).
38
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-98, ADOPTION TAX CREDIT: IRS CAN
REDUCE AUDITS AND REFUND DELAYS 10 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586423.html [https://perma
.cc/J6HY-2TRE](noting that the IRS had audited 68% of returns claiming the adoption tax credit but found
no fraud and only disallowed all or part of the credit for 17% of the returns audited); David Cay Johnston,
I.R.S. Audits of Working Poor Increase, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2002) http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/01
/business/irs-audits-of-working-poor-increase.html [https://perma.cc/K6PL-X3CY] (criticizing IRS for
increasing audits of taxpayers claiming the EITC).
39
I.R.C. § 36B (2012); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
40
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
41
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (noting the ACA’s goals
and size).
42
Examples include excise taxes on indoor tanning services (I.R.C. § 5000B) and medical devices
(I.R.C. § 4191). See also Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov
/Affordable-Care-Act/Affordable-Care-Act-Tax-Provisions [http://perma.cc/3EWP-UF8M] (listing and
describing ACA tax provisions, including but not limited to several excise taxes).
43
I.R.C. § 5000A (2012).
44
See, e.g., T.D. 9578, Group Health Plans and Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15,
2012).
45
See, e.g., T.D. 9491, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition
Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,188 (June 28,
2010), 2010-32 I.R.B. 186, 188–89.
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may or may not offer incentives for participating in wellness programs.46 Most recently,
in King v. Burwell, the IRS had to defend its determination that taxpayers retained
eligibility for the premium tax credit when they purchased health insurance on
“exchanges” established by the federal government rather than state governments. 47
Although the IRS won the case, the Supreme Court noted that the IRS “has no expertise
in crafting health insurance policy” and, consequently, declined to give its interpretation
the usual deference extended to agency interpretations of statutes they administer.48
Beyond the ACA, the IRS plays a leading role in administering pension benefits
as well as health care under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).49 Congress enacted ERISA to protect participants in certain employee pension
and welfare plans, including health coverage plans, by imposing various participation,
vesting, funding, reporting, and disclosure requirements on the employers and unions that
sponsor them. 50 The role of the IRS in administering the pension aspects of ERISA
largely corresponds to provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that exclude qualifying
pension contributions and earnings from taxable income 51 —acknowledged tax
expenditure items.52 By contrast, IRS responsibilities for administering ERISA health
coverage requirements (as opposed to ACA health coverage requirements) relate most
closely to a financial penalty, styled as an excise tax, imposed by the Internal Revenue
Code on nonconforming group health plans. 53 In administering ERISA, the IRS has
worked in recent years, again with HHS and Labor, to adopt regulations concerning the
length of hospital stays for new mothers and their newborn infants54 and ensuring that the
mental health and substance abuse disorder benefits provided by group health plans enjoy
46
See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs
in Group Health Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620 (Nov. 26, 2012).
47
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015).
48
Id. at 2489.
49
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
50
See STEVEN J. SACHER, JAMES I. SINGER & TERESE M. CONNERTON, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW
22–35 (2d ed. 2000); Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution
Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 163–66 (2013). Although historical accounts of ERISA focus primarily on
pension reform, Congress drafted ERISA to cover a broader array of employee welfare plans, including
employer-sponsored health insurance plans. See SACHER ET AL., supra, at 28.
51
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401–407, 410–418E, 457 (2012). Many of these provisions have parallel
provisions in ERISA, and Treasury claims interpretive jurisdiction over both. See COLLEEN E. MEDILL,
INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 95–96 (3d ed. 2011); see also T.D. 9419, Mortality Tables for
Determining Present Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,632 (July 31, 2008), 2008-40 I.R.B. 790, 791 n.1 (asserting
jurisdiction to adopt mortality tables for determining present value and making other computations for
purposes of applying pension funding requirements under I.R.C. §§ 412 and 430 as well as ERISA § 302);
T.D. 9484, Diversification Requirements for Certain Defined Contribution Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,927 (May
19, 2010); 2010-24 I.R.B. 748, 748–49 (adopting regulations concerning diversification requirements for
defined contribution plans holding publicly traded employer securities under both I.R.C. § 401(a)(35) and
parallel provision 29 U.S.C. § 204(j)).
52
2012 CRS COMPENDIUM, supra note 28, at 963.
53
Specifically, for any group health plan that fails to meet the requirements of I.R.C. ch. 100,
I.R.C. § 4980D imposes an excise tax upon a sponsoring employer of $100 per day, per individual affected.
I.R.C. § 4980D (2012). Chapter 100, in turn, imposes an array of portability, access, and renewability
requirements, as well as benefit requirements for mothers and newborns and for mental health, among other
things. I.R.C. §§ 9801–9802, 9811–9812 (2012) (imposing group health plan requirements); see also
MEDILL, supra note 51, at 354–55 (discussing the “excise tax penalty” adopted to enforce group health plan
requirements).
54
T.D. 9427, Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Under the
Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 62410 (Oct. 20, 2008).
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parity with those plans’ medical and surgical benefits55—also subjects that fall outside
the IRS’s primary expertise. One need not be anti-IRS to question whether IRS
personnel are desirable arbiters of such matters.
The IRS also plays a key role in regulating the activities of the exempt
organization sector.56 Current IRS administration efforts in this one area now involve an
entire IRS division (out of only four) monitoring more than 1.6 million tax exempt
organizations 57 across a few dozen separate statutory classifications that encompass
universities with billion-dollar endowments and tiny religious schools teaching a few
dozen students; large hospitals and small, free health clinics; labor unions; chambers of
commerce; churches, big and small; the Metropolitan Opera and tiny, rural theater
companies; the local Elks Lodge; and your Aunt Sadie’s garden club.58 Defining which
organizations are eligible for exempt status and, separately, which may receive tax
deductible contributions is complicated.59 Evaluating applications for exempt status and
monitoring existing organizations for continued compliance with eligibility requirements
are even more difficult and often require the IRS to venture outside its primary expertise.
Tax administrators in this sector routinely make decisions implicating issues as varied as
free speech, politics, and religion; 60 election law and campaign finance; 61 and, again,
health policy and hospital governance.62 For example, public charities are not allowed to
participate in election campaigns, but the IRS’s efforts to curb political speech by church
55

T.D. 9479, Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410 (Feb. 2, 2010).
56
But see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities In The Twenty-First
Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 498 (2010) (“Despite the IRS’s recent
attempts to regulate charity governance, it is generally recognized that Congress, in granting tax exemption to
charitable organizations, did not intend for the IRS to become a national regulator of the charitable sector.”).
57
See At-a-Glance: IRS Divisions and Principal Offices, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs
.gov/uac/At-a-Glance:-IRS-Divisions-and-Principal-Offices [http://perma.cc/HS29-EQA6] (listing four
primary IRS divisions: Wage and Investment; Large Business and International; Small Business/SelfEmployed; and Tax-Exempt and Government Entities); Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division at a
Glance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Government-Entities/Tax-Exempt-&-GovernmentEntities-Division-At-a-Glance [http://perma.cc/WP25-3R6L] (describing the work of the TE/GE division and
noting “this sector is not designed to generate revenue, but rather to ensure that the entities fulfill the policy
goals that their tax exemption was designed to achieve”).
58
I.R.C. § 501(c)(1)–(29), (d)–(f) (2012); see also Charles A. Borek, Decoupling Tax Exemption
for Charitable Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 201–07 (2004); James J. Fishman, The
Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 303, 303–05 (2006).
59
Only some exempt organizations can receive tax deductible contributions. Compare I.R.C. § 501
(listing types of exempt organizations), with I.R.C. § 170(c) (listing organizations eligible to receive
deductible contributions).
60
See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of Church and
State Justify the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in Partisan Political Speech?, 84 IND. L.J.
447 (2009); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 771 (2001); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS
Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001).
61
Demonstrating the issues that the IRS faces in this area, in 2011, the Election Law Journal
published an entire volume on this topic. For just a few of the contributions to that volume, see, for example,
Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011);
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10
ELECTION L.J. 407 (2011); Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair
to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427 (2011).
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See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Putting the Community Back into the “Community Benefit” Standard, 44
GA. L. REV. 375, 377 (2010) (discussing IRS-developed “community benefit” criteria that nonprofit hospitals
must satisfy to maintain exempt status).
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leaders implicate First Amendment issues that the IRS has proven ill-equipped to handle,
damaging the IRS’s credibility.63 For another prime example of the difficulties the IRS
faces in regulating nonprofits, one need look no further than the recent IRS-Tea Party
kerfuffle, concerning the IRS’s efforts to evaluate the involvement of Internal Revenue
Code § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations in candidate-related political activities. No
matter whom or what one blames for that brouhaha, the fact remains that the IRS failed to
appreciate the landmine onto which it was stepping, and then handled the aftermath
ineptly, resulting in lasting damage to the IRS’s public image.64 The IRS’s subsequent
attempt to promulgate regulations to clarify exactly which activities are candidate-related
political activities was almost as fraught. The IRS received more than 150,000
comments—many critical—from a broad array of interested parties and members of the
public, prompting the IRS to delay the implementation of those regulations.65
These and other programs, purposes, and functions that are at best tangentially
related to the IRS’s revenue raising mission take up a much greater proportion of tax
administration efforts and resources than is generally realized. In other work, I
documented the extent to which Treasury and IRS focus their regulatory efforts on tax
expenditures and other social welfare and regulatory programs as opposed to revenue
raising.66 According to that study, from 2008 through 2012, Treasury and the IRS spent
almost as much time and effort drafting regulations addressing tax expenditures and other
social welfare and regulatory matters like the Affordable Care Act, ERISA, and exempt
organizations as they did drafting regulations addressing the individual, payroll, and
corporate income tax matters that actually raise revenue. 67 In short, the IRS has
transitioned over time from a mission-driven agency that collects taxes to an omnibus
agency that does many things.
III.
THE PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS OF THE MULTI-MISSION IRS
Tax policy experts have debated for some time whether and under what
circumstances Congress ought to assign nontax responsibilities to the IRS. For example,
a sizable literature exists considering whether and under what circumstances tax
expenditures are adequate substitutes for, or perhaps even more effective than, direct
spending programs. Comparing the EITC and food stamp programs as illustrative, David
Weissbach and Jacob Nussim argue that the IRS’s special expertise in measuring income
makes it especially suited to administer means-tested welfare programs. 68 Also
comparing the EITC and food stamps, Larry Zelenak touts the benefits of allowing
people to self-declare their eligibility for government benefits, rather than requiring
precertification of eligibility.69 Ann Alstott counters that, because beneficiaries claim the
63
See, e.g., Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1315–17 (2007) (describing the controversy).
64
See, e.g., Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41 (2013) (detailing the controversy, describing the IRS’s “ineptitude” and
“[b]ureaucratic bungling,” and concluding that the incident “inflicted needless damage on the IRS”).
65
E.g., IRS Update on the Proposed New Regulation on 501(c)(4) Organizations, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (May 22, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Update-on-the-Proposed-NewRegulation-on-501%28c%29%284%29-Organizations [http://perma.cc/796F-8FQD]; IRS to Rewrite
Nonprofit Rules Amid Criticism, POLITICO (May 23, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/irsrewrite-nonprofit-rules-amid-criticism-107015.html [http://perma.cc/342C-JJPY].
66
Hickman, supra note 16.
67
Id. at 1746–53.
68
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 35, at 1001–02.
69
Zelenak, supra note 35, at 1915.
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EITC by filing an annual tax return, that program is less able than more traditional
welfare programs to respond timely to changes in personal circumstances.70 Eric Laity
complains that tax expenditures shift administrative costs from the government to the
private sector—which others might find a feature rather than a bug. 71 Eric Toder
suggests that both tax expenditures and direct spending possess potential attributes and
difficulties, and he counsels careful case-by-case consideration of programmatic design.72
Relatively little scholarly consideration has been paid, however, to whether administering
such programs might cause problems for the IRS. And, of course, the IRS’s capacity to
administer any one social welfare or regulatory program effectively (or at least
effectively enough) does not automatically equate with a capacity to administer many
such programs simultaneously.
Having a government agency serve multiple missions is not always problematic.
Cabinet-level departments serve multiple missions, with a single leadership that oversees
a variety of subordinate offices, bureaus, administrations, and agencies—although those
subordinate agencies within agencies are more typically oriented toward a single mission.
For example, the Department of the Treasury includes not only the IRS but also the U.S.
Mint, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing,
and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, as well as several policy offices, on
its organization chart.73 And the Department of Health and Human Services includes the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, the Indian Health Service, and the Food and Drug Administration among its
many offices and operating divisions.74 Just as Cabinet-level departments coordinate and
manage the many functions of their subordinate agencies, so too a single agency ought to
be able to organize its personnel to administer multiple programs.
Moreover, using an existing agency like the IRS to administer new programs or
functions is not unusual in American government. Congress often has very good reasons
to assign a new program or function to an existing administrative agency, even when that
new program or function is not entirely germane to the agency’s original or core mission.
The case for utilizing an existing agency for a new program or function often focuses on
a combination of efficiency and resource constraints.75 Setting up a new agency takes
time, so assigning a new program or function to an existing bureaucracy may allow for
faster implementation. Such assignments are not entirely random; Congress generally
tasks an existing agency with a new program or function based on its perception that the

70

Ann Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and The Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform,
108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 579–84 (1995).
71
Eric Laity, The Corporation As Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and Institutional
Design, 48 VA. TAX REV. 411, 425, 442–43 (2008).
72
Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending—Does it Make a Difference?, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 361, 365–
370.
73
See Organizational Structure, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about
/organizational-structure/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/Y9TC-EZ3F]; Bureaus, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/bureaus/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma
.cc/2VKG-ZCPB].
74
HHS Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov
/about/agencies/orgchart/index.html [http://perma.cc/T38E-HFXY].
75
Rachel Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice,
99 VA. L. REV. 271, 307–08 (2013) (noting these considerations in the context of assigning tangential
functions to the Department of Justice).
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agency may have some specialized expertise relevant to the task. 76 When a new
program’s goals overlap or are at least compatible with an existing agency’s core mission
or expertise, then the agency’s ability to coordinate among those complimentary
programs may create synergies that achieve superior outcomes while conserving
government resources. Even when programmatic goals are not so closely aligned, for
smaller or more experimental programs, creating a new agency may make little sense
when an existing agency’s expertise is at least close enough for Congress to believe it can
handle the additional responsibility appropriately.
Just because Congress can assign multiple missions to an agency does not mean,
however, that Congress always should. The more missions an agency has, the greater the
strain on the agency. In measuring agency priorities, scholars who study agency design
often describe agencies as having primary and secondary missions. They recognize that
an agency often, or even typically, will pursue its primary mission, perhaps to the
detriment of secondary missions, for a variety of reasons.77
Which goals an agency prioritizes can depend on a number of factors including
political pressure, measurability, agency culture, and personnel.78 For example, political
and economic pressure from Congress, lobbyists, and executive oversight typically will
push an agency toward its primary mission. 79 The more an agency’s primary and
secondary missions conflict—yielding opposing pressures, the more likely the agency
will shirk its secondary responsibilities. J.R. DeShazo’s and Jody Freeman’s study of
hydropower relicensing decisions by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
is illustrative. 80 As its name suggests, FERC’s responsibilities and expertise center
around energy, yet FERC also has secondary environmental obligations under the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species
Act. DeShazo and Freeman posit that, at least from 1982 to 1998, FERC resisted pursuit
of its environmental responsibilities because Congress and the executive branch
prioritized propower policies in light of the 1970s energy crisis, even as they continued to
support environmental protection.81
Agencies also tend to favor missions, goals, or functions that are easily measured
and monitored—focusing on short-term, tangible results rather than abstract policy
ideals.82 From a practical standpoint, and in light of political pressures, this preferencing
makes sense. Congress and the executive branch reward agencies they regard as
successful, and nothing demonstrates success so much as tangible, quantifiable results.
Agencies may thus allocate fewer resources to secondary missions that pursue more
76

See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 35, at 987–90 (discussing the role of expertise in
organizational design).
77
See, e.g., Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do: How To Deal With The Dysfunctions Of MultipleGoal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (concluding that “agencies are most likely to
underperform on ‘secondary goals’ that both interfere with the completion of what are perceived to be the
agency’s primary goals”); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2217, 2221 (2005) (noting that political pressure from Congress and lobbyists both will push an agency
toward one primary mission); Barkow, supra note 75, at 306–07 (suggesting that the prosecutorial functions
of the Department of Justice have won out against the secondary interests of corrections, clemency, and
forensic science).
78
Barkow, supra note 75, at 307–12 (drawing these factors from the agency design literature).
79
Id. at 309; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 77, at 2221.
80
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 77, at 2221–22 (describing the study).
81
Id. at 2230–45.
82
Barkow, supra note 75, at 310.
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abstract goals, such as promoting societal equality, welfare, or environmental
sustainability.83
Agency culture additionally plays a prominent role in how an agency approaches
its various missions.
Internal cultural conflicts are pervasive throughout the
administrative state. Political scientist James Q. Wilson generalized about the effects of
culture on agencies:
First, tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to with the
same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are part of it.
Second, organizations in which two or more cultures struggle for
supremacy will experience serious conflict as defenders of one seek to
dominate representatives of others. Third, organizations will resist
taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture.
The stronger and more uniform the culture—that is, the more the culture
approximates a sense of mission—the more obvious these
84
consequences.
Wilson offered as an example the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
discussed at greater length in Part IV below, as an agency torn between competing goals:
“Keep out illegal immigrants, but let in necessary agricultural workers”; “find and expel
illegal aliens, but do not break up families, impose hardships, violate civil rights, or
85
deprive employers of low-paid workers.”
Rachel Barkow’s examination of the
Department of Justice’s administration of corrections, clemency, and forensic science
matters further illustrates Wilson’s point. Barkow observed that the Department of
Justice has a culture that is oriented toward its prosecutorial function, and that culture has
resulted in fewer pardons, undermined reform efforts by the Bureau of Prisons, and
86
encouraged botched scientific investigations that favor the prosecution.
In sum,
agencies struggle with or even ignore outright secondary goals that conflict with their
dominant culture, and too much tension between competing functions can undermine
agency efforts across the board.
An agency’s culture is intertwined with its personnel and leadership. Agencies
recruit like-minded individuals to preserve their culture and further their primary
87
missions. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
hires engineers who demonstrate a “‘can-do’ attitude based on the diligent and systematic
application of hard work and engineering principles,” rejecting subjective orientations
that emphasize “I feel” or “I think” in favor of a “complete, fully documented, verifiable
88
set of data.” Personnel also shape how primary missions are defined and measured.
For example, the Forest Service employs biologists, economists, engineers, and foresters,
all of whom define the Forest Service’s mission of attaining “sustainable yields”
89
differently.
83
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In summary, when Congress assigns a new program or function to an existing
agency, the general understanding is that the new program or function may “take a
90
backseat” to the agency’s primary or core mission. Agencies tend to focus on the tasks
likely to garner the most attention from Congress and gravitate toward goals that are most
91
easily measured and achieved. In such circumstances, an agency is likely to hire new
employees whose skills and interests align with such efforts, solidifying an agency
92
culture that emphasizes some programs or functions, even to the detriment of others.
Consequently, the efficacy of the new program or function may suffer somewhat as a
consequence of Congress’s decision to assign it to an existing agency. One can imagine
such is especially the case when an agency is established originally to accomplish one
mission and only subsequently had other, conflicting missions grafted onto its brief.
When an agency’s multiple missions are in tension with one another, the agency may be
particularly hard pressed to accomplish all of them well. No agency or government
program design is perfect, and life and government both often require such tradeoffs. To
a great extent, therefore, the question really is whether and when the costs of the tradeoff
outweigh the benefits.
The IRS’s administration of nontax programs—even if well-intentioned and
dutiful—suffers from many of these same issues. The IRS’s traditional mission as the
nation’s tax collector dominates everything it is and does. The IRS’s mission statement
emphasizes compliance, helping taxpayers “understand and meet their tax
93
responsibilities,” and ensuring that taxpayers “pay their fair share.” The IRS’s website
home page is loaded with information about preparing and filing tax returns and paying
94
taxes, with only a few nods toward other matters within the IRS’s jurisdiction: a
“Credits & Deductions” tab linked to lists of prominent tax benefits available through
95
filing an annual tax return; a “Hot Topics” reference to the Affordable Care Act linked
to a page that in turn refers to “important changes” to “how individuals and families file
96
their taxes;” and a “News” item linked to an acknowledgment of “the 10th Anniversary
97
of EITC Awareness Day,” for example. The IRS publishes dozens of reports annually
documenting the numbers of tax returns filed and audits conducted, and the amounts of
98
taxes received and refunds paid—all of which are readily quantifiable. Speeches by the
IRS Commissioner regarding the agency’s challenges and priorities emphasize answering
taxpayer questions, improving tax enforcement, and collecting more revenue: “For every
dollar invested [in the IRS budget], there can be returns ranging from 6-to-1 and even up

90
Barkow, supra note 75, at 307–12; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for
the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 119 (2000) (“That agencies are systematically more loyal to their
basic mission seems persuasive, even obvious.”).
91
Barkow, supra note 75, at 308–10.
92
Id.
93
The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov
/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority [https://perma.cc/XLZ4-2ZW4].
94
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ [https://perma.cc/T8SL-XVHG].
95
Id. (linking to https://www.irs.gov/Credits-&-Deductions [https://perma.cc/ZHM4-6YQ3]).
96
Id. (linking to https://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act [https://perma.cc/GUF8-WQ2N]).
97
Id. (linking to https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/On-the-10th-Anniversary-of-EITCAwareness-Day-IRS-Alerts-Workers-of-Significant-Tax-Benefit [https://perma.cc/3K9N-767N]).
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dozens of IRS reports).
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to 20-to-1 in some initiatives.”
The IRS does not, by comparison, provide reports
documenting its impact or otherwise touting its efforts in achieving other congressional
goals like alleviating poverty, protecting the environment, or improving access to health
care.
Consider one representative example that illustrates the IRS’s focus: the annual
IRS Data Book, most recently issued for 2014. The 2014 IRS Data Book includes table
after table documenting tax collections and refunds, tax returns and other forms filed, and
100
audits and other enforcement actions pursued.
“Taxpayer assistance” is denominated
principally in terms of the various ways in which IRS personnel answer taxpayer
questions—e.g., through telephone calls answered, walk-in assistance contacts made, or
101
website visits made —and also the number of appeals of proposed liability assessments
102
the IRS handled,
although the IRS additionally tracks by type the various matters
103
addressed by the Taxpayer Advocate Service.
The Data Book further contains sections
concerning tax-exempt organizations and the Affordable Care Act. But rather than
discussing how the IRS’s efforts accomplish congressional goals in those sectors, the
104
Data Book denominates filings processed, guidance issued, and taxes collected.
Consistent with its primary mission and the emphasis of its leadership, the IRS’s
workforce is culturally oriented toward raising revenue, maximizing collections, and
protecting the fisc. Most of the IRS bureaucracy is focused on the practical, accountingoriented functions of processing and evaluating hundreds of millions of taxpayer filings
with the end goal of evaluating who has paid and who still owes, taxpayer by taxpayer,
entity by entity. The webpage advertising careers that prospective employees might
pursue with the IRS lists administrative and clerical positions; accounting, budget, and
finance positions; business and tax enforcement positions; research and analysis
positions; tax law specialist positions; mail and file, financial, and cash processing clerk
positions; and tax examiner positions, among others—but does not list positions
suggesting training or aptitude in social work, health policy, environmental policy, or any
105
of the myriad nontax functions Congress has assigned to the agency.
Anecdotally,
casual conversations with IRS managers reveal a perception that their responsibility visa-vis tax expenditures is to hold the line on spending through interpretation and
enforcement, not to achieve the congressional goals that inspired the tax expenditures in
the first place.
The quantitative skills and fiscal orientation of IRS personnel are well suited for
the agency’s primary function of collecting government revenue; processing and
evaluating hundreds of millions of taxpayer filings and collecting trillions of dollars in
99
Statement of IRS Commissioner John Koskinen on the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget (Feb. 2, 2015),
https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Statement-of-IRS-Commissioner-John-Koskinen-on-the-Fiscal-Year2016-Budget [https://perma.cc/SWR5-SVRE]; see also, e.g., Written Testimony of Commissioner Koskinen
Before the House Ways and Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight on the 2015 Tax Filing Season
(Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Written-Testimony-of-IRS-Commissioner-Koskinen-before-theHouse-Ways-and-Means-Committee [https://perma.cc/AR64-JTXF] (reflecting similar emphases).
100
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2014, supra note 5, at 1–
46.
101
Id. at 48–49.
102
Id. at 51.
103
Id. at 50.
104
Id. at 53–58, 71–72.
105
See Our Careers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://jobs.irs.gov/careers.html [https://perma.cc
/FVW8-2X5H].
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taxes is no small task. Those same employees may be of less utility but cause little real
harm in the administration of some tax expenditures, like a research and development
106
credit adopted to encourage corporate investment in such activities, an exclusion of
municipal bond interest maintained to subsidize local government activities and
107
investments, or a home mortgage interest deduction intended to promote middle-class
108
home ownership.
But the IRS’s green-eyeshade culture may make the IRS
spectacularly ill equipped for some of the tasks Congress has assigned it. IRS personnel
are not automatons or drones, but nor are they social workers, environmental scientists,
109
health policy experts, or First Amendment scholars.
They are not trained, and thus
may often fail to recognize when their efforts will implicate nontax values, sensitivities,
or needs. As Mary Heen has observed with respect to anti-poverty programs in
particular, “[a] revenue-raising system, overseen by accountants, tax lawyers, and tax
administrators, has serious shortcomings as a mechanism for administering social benefit
programs, such as distributing income security funds to low-income workers and
110
development funds to low-income housing programs.”
It would be lamentable enough if the IRS’s focus, culture, and expertise
limitations were merely obstacles to accomplishing congressional goals of alleviating
poverty, improving access to health care, or encouraging the pursuits of the nonprofit
sector. But the disconnect between the IRS’s traditional revenue raising function and
some of its contemporary social welfare and regulatory responsibilities poses a more
fundamental problem for the IRS itself. Some of these social welfare and regulatory
programs have drawn the IRS into controversial political waters. Last year’s King v.
Burwell decision saw the IRS dragged into a highly politicized controversy over taxpayer
111
eligibility for Affordable Care Act subsidies, a subject the Supreme Court recognized
112
as outside the IRS’s expertise.
Even if one is inclined to give the IRS the benefit of the
doubt when it comes to its past handling of 501(c)(4) exemption applications, only the
most partisan ideologues think the IRS handled that controversy adeptly and escaped
113
undamaged in the eyes of average taxpayers.
Other examples already noted include
whether in the nonprofit area with the First Amendment rights of churches and 501(c)(4)
114
social welfare organizations,
under the Affordable Care Act in requiring health
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111
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2486–87 (2015).
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Id. at 2489 (declining to apply the Chevron review standard to the IRS’s interpretation of the
Affordable Care Act because the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy”).
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See, e.g., Kahng, supra note 64, at 41 (2013) (detailing the controversy, describing the IRS’s
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115

insurance plans to include contraceptive coverage, or through IRS efforts to combat
116
EITC fraud using traditional tax enforcement tools like tax return audits and penalties.
Moreover, the integration of social welfare programs into the Internal Revenue
Code has a substantial impact on the profile of the persons most likely to have to engage
in a meaningful way with IRS personnel. Historically, a simple wage earner with two
children who did not itemize her deductions would have interacted rather minimally with
IRS personnel—filing a relatively uncomplicated annual tax return, perhaps receiving a
refund or at least not owing much tax. Now, that same individual grapples with pages
and pages of forms and instructions to avail herself of social welfare benefits like the
EITC or the child tax credit. She might enjoy the check she receives from the IRS at the
outset. But if she makes a mistake, the IRS will not seem so friendly as it seeks to recoup
the distributed funds and she additionally faces the prospect of penalties for
117
underpayment of taxes.
Whether or not one believes that the IRS has done anything wrong in any of
these situations, the IRS’s frequently flat-footed and tone-deaf reactions—both before
and after controversy erupted—have undermined taxpayer perceptions of the agency’s
competence as well as its fairness. Agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency
or the National Labor Relations Board may be expected to pursue partisan priorities. The
IRS, by contrast, relies heavily on its reputation for fairness and impartiality, and cannot
afford to be perceived otherwise. Unfortunately, as noted, Congress’s response has been
to cut the IRS’s budget, even as politicians from both parties call for adding to the IRS’s
118
burden by adopting even more programs for the IRS to administer.
The IRS just
cannot succeed under these conditions.
IV.
RETURNING TO A SINGLE MISSION (OR CLOSE TO IT)
The purpose of this Essay is not to offer a precise blueprint for removing
programs and functions from the IRS’s jurisdiction. Accomplishing such a task would be
substantially more complicated and require far more expertise than any one symposium
essay or person can offer. Instead, having argued that making the IRS a multi-mission
agency has harmed the IRS’s ability to perform its critical role as the federal
government’s tax collector, this Essay merely suggests that tax policymakers and
administrators ought to contemplate either spinning off certain programs and functions
from the IRS or splitting up the IRS altogether to segregate revenue raising from other
government activities.
Of course, the devil is in the details, and trying to segregate the revenue
collection function altogether from other congressional goals is a fool’s errand. But the
IRS is not unique in seeing its responsibilities grow and change over time, and past
restructurings of other, nontax agencies may offer significant guidance in this regard.
A.
Learning from Other Agency Experiences
The IRS is hardly alone in finding itself overburdened with multiple missions and
in need of a substantial overhaul. From the century plus of the modern administrative
state, examples abound. The past decade alone has seen at least two such examples.
115

See discussion supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text (listing this and other examples of
controversial IRS actions implementing the Affordable Care Act).
116
See discussion supra note 36–38 and accompanying text (noting criticism of IRS administration
of the EITC program).
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See Drumbl, supra note 33, at 140–41 (describing how this happens).
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See discussion supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
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After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress discerned that consumer finance regulation was
spread among several agencies, none of which viewed consumer protection as their
primary mission.119 Perceiving a greater need to protect consumers within the financial
sphere, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Board and reassigned functions
from several other agencies to it.120 Also, in the wake of the massive Deepwater Horizon
oil spill in 2010, government officials realized that the agency responsible for regulating
offshore oil development, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), had subordinated
its safety and environmental regulatory functions to its other missions of facilitating
offshore drilling and production and collecting government royalties therefrom. 121
Consequently, the Secretary of the Interior ordered that the MMS and its responsibilities
be divided into three new successor agencies—the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, the Office of Natural Resources Revenue, and the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement—segregating the agency’s permitting and revenuecollection tasks from its enforcement functions, and thereby removing the conflict among
those missions.122
Just as each agency is at least somewhat unique, the story behind each
reorganization of a government agency is a little different. Nevertheless, commonalities
exist. The experiences of other agencies in the past may offer useful insights into the
IRS’s present problems. The following discussion describes in greater depth two such
reorganizations as especially instructive: the spinoff of telephone regulation from the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to the Federal Communication Commission
(FCC) in 1934, and the division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into
three successor agencies in 2003.
1.
The Interstate Commerce Commission
The ICC was originally established in 1887 to regulate railroads as common
carriers. 123 Throughout its existence, the ICC’s primary expertise lay in the area of
transportation services.124 Over time, the ICC’s authority was expanded to encompass
other transportation industries, such as trucking and interstate bus lines.125 The ICC was
119
Dylan J. Castellino, A Spotlight on Shadow Banking: The CFPB Finalizes Procedures to
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DEEPWATER OIL SPILL 1–3 (2010) (hereinafter REORGANIZATION OF THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE).
122
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eventually abolished and its functions were transferred to the Surface Transportation
Board.126
In 1910, the Mann-Elkins Act gave the ICC authority to regulate telephone and
telegraph services as well.127 Obviously, the mechanics of railroads and telephones are
very different. So why give the ICC authority over telephones in the first place? The
courts had decided that telephone companies were at least strongly akin to common
carriers, prompting state governments to regulate their intrastate activities.128 But in the
late 1800s and early 1900s, the economic significance of interstate communications was
negligible. 129 The ICC, as the regulator of railroads, had significant experience and
expertise in issues associated with common carrier regulation, including but not limited
to setting rates and enforcing nondiscrimination requirements.130
With the Communications Act of 1934, Congress transferred responsibility for
telephone service regulation from the ICC to the newly-created Federal Communications
Commission. 131 The ICC supported that transfer. 132 No crisis prompted Congress to
move telephone regulation from the ICC to the FCC. According to Jim Speta, “[i]n 1934,
there were no burning issues forcing new regulation of telephone companies.”133 But the
ICC had not asked Congress to give it jurisdiction over telephones,134 and its personnel
were focused primarily on regulating railroads and less interested in telephones. 135
Meanwhile, the telephone industry was growing. 136 With that growth came new
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complexities. Key aspects of the industries’ structures were different.137 Methods that
had been successful in regulating railroads proved inadequate in the context of
telephones.138 Contemporary documents reflect perceptions that the task of regulating
telephone service had simply grown too great to leave as a secondary function of the
ICC. 139 According to the New York Times, the chief sponsor of the 1934
Communications Act, Senator Clarence Dill, maintained that an ICC focused primarily
on railroad issues simply could not “deal adequately with the communications
problem.”140
In summary, Congress initially assigned what it perceived to be a relatively
minor secondary function to an existing agency that seemed to have relevant expertise.
As the secondary function grew in size and complexity, the limitations of that assignment
became apparent. The agency’s emphasis on its primary mission meant that the
secondary function received less attention, blunting the advantages of the agency’s
expertise. And the agency’s lack of knowledge about other important aspects of the
secondary function correspondingly hampered its ability to accomplish congressional
goals. Hence, Congress decided to spin off the secondary function to an agency created
specifically to serve those goals.
Of course, spinning off communications matters from the ICC to the FCC created
its own issues. In particular, assigning the responsibility for regulating an industry to a
single government agency with no other agenda is a perfect recipe for regulatory
capture—whereby the agency comes to identify so closely to the industry it regulates that
it ultimately serves the interests of industry participants as much as or more than the
public interest. Both critics and more neutral observers of the FCC’s history level
precisely that complaint.141
2.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service
The story of the INS is a little different. In 1933, President Roosevelt issued an
executive order establishing the INS as a combination of the Bureau of Immigration and
the Bureau of Naturalization, both of which were housed in the Department of Labor.142
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In 1940, Congress moved the INS to the Department of Justice, where it operated for
several decades.143
As part of the Department of Justice, the INS served two sets of functions that,
arguably, were in tension with one another. First, the INS was an “enforcement agency,”
charged with preventing immigrants from entering the country illegally, finding and
deporting illegal immigrants, and sanctioning employers of undocumented workers. 144
Additionally, however, the INS was a “service agency,” charged with processing millions
of applications annually from U.S. companies, citizens, permanent residents, and others
applying for “immigration benefits” such as visas for foreign workers, family members,
or asylum seekers, or certificates of naturalization.145
By the 1990s, the INS was an agency in crisis. Chronic budget shortfalls were
one problem, although this was due more to financial mismanagement than to
congressional budget cuts.146 Service fees were a significant source of funds for the INS,
representing roughly one third of its budget.147 Every year, the INS overestimated the
fees it would collect and failed to collect fees that it was owed.148 Due to poor internal
financial controls, the INS also endured a bribery scandal.149
The INS’s primary difficulty, however, was its inability to balance effectively its
enforcement functions with its more service-oriented benefit functions. Culturally, the
INS prioritized its enforcement functions, cultivating an “enforcement mentality” in
training its employees, and emphasizing enforcement experience in filling management
positions. 150 The agency’s emphasis on its enforcement functions often resulted in
apathy, suspicion, and hostility toward applicants for immigration benefits, prompting
even agency employees to describe their organization as “cold, rude, [and] insensitive.”151
Yet, the INS’s service functions—resolving millions of individual applications for
immigration benefits each year—were, quite literally, the INS’s “bread and butter,” given
the agency’s reliance on service fees. 152 Meanwhile, even as the INS regarded its
enforcement functions as primary, the INS was criticized for failing to deport convicted
felons, and when they did, for failing to stop those same felons from reentering the
country. 153 Yet, even successful border control efforts prompted criticism from
143
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congressional and executive branch officials, essentially for complicating the service side
of the equation.154
A series of articles by the New York Times summed up the INS’s difficulties.
“Hobbled by understaffing, underfinancing, conflicting mandates from Congress and
widespread mismanagement failures, it is an agency in disarray. It lurches from one
immigration emergency to the next, its employees demoralized, its mission
unrealized.”155 Subsequently, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform,
created by the Immigration Act of 1990 to evaluate the immigration system,156 concluded,
While some argue that enforcement and benefits are complimentary
functions, . . . placing incompatible services and enforcement functions
within one agency creates problems: competition for resources; lack of
coordination and cooperation; and personnel practices that both
encourage transfer between enforcement and service positions and create
confusion regarding mission and responsibilities.
Combining
responsibility for enforcement and benefits also blurs the distinction
between illegal migration and legal admissions. As a matter of public
policy, it is important to maintain a bright line between those two forms
of entry.157
The Commission counseled assigning the immigration enforcement and immigration
service functions to different agencies. 158 In 2002, Congress did just that. In the
Homeland Security Act, Congress disbanded the INS and divided its functions among
three new agencies—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—all
within the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.159
Splitting the INS has created its own problems, most obviously with respect to
interagency coordination between the newly-created agencies within the Department of
Homeland Security,160 and also between the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice. For example, under the new structure, both CIS and the Executive
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), which is housed in the Department of Justice,
adjudicate asylum proceedings.161 EOIR and CIS do not readily share information and
154
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have not adopted standard procedures, to the detriment of asylum applicants seeking legal
benefits. Along these lines, the failure of EOIR and CIS to collaboratively manage
applicants’ asylum clocks 162 resulted in a class action lawsuit against the agencies. 163
And EOIR and CIS are not the only agencies that clash in the immigration context.164
Nevertheless, these coordination difficulties pale in comparison to the problems
associated with the former INS’s clashing missions and cultures.
B.
Contemplating the IRS’s Future
The parallels between these stories and the IRS’s current situation should be
obvious. For example, making exempt status determinations and monitoring exempt
organizations was once a relatively small and straightforward endeavor. Over the
decades, as the nonprofit sector has expanded and as Congress has recognized new
categories of exempt organizations, the task has grown and become substantially more
complicated, giving rise to a host of issues the IRS is ill equipped to handle. Similarly,
an initially modest EITC has been expanded several times, and has correspondingly
increased in complexity, again placing the IRS in its present, more challenging position
as that program’s administrator. The IRS is being torn apart by conflicts that, for the
most part, are not of its making. The question is how to resolve that problem.
The most straightforward approach to dealing with the IRS’s issues would be to
spin off the largest and most politically damaging IRS programs and functions to other
new or existing agencies. For example, even if Congress wants to continue using tax
credits and deductions rather direct subsidies to accomplish social welfare goals, another
agency could determine and monitor eligibility, handle enforcement of eligibility
requirements, and then coordinate with and rely on the IRS to administer the mechanics
of processing the credits or deductions through tax returns. Social workers with expertise
in the issues faced by socioeconomically disadvantaged persons, rather than tax experts,
could determine and monitor eligibility for the EITC and like refundable tax credits, and
handle claims of ineligibility and fraud as well, removing those responsibilities from the
IRS’s jurisdiction. Perhaps Congress could spin off exempt organization determinations
and monitoring wholesale, and have the responsible agency just provide the IRS with a
list of approved entities. If the IRS suspects a problem with a particular entity, it could
refer the matter back to the responsible agency.
By comparison, abolishing the IRS outright seems extreme. Certainly, the
federal government cannot function without a revenue agency of some sort. Whatever
the IRS’s problems, abolishing the IRS and discarding an otherwise effective tax
162
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administration infrastructure developed over more than 100 years, only to start over with
a new revenue agency, seems wasteful and counterproductive. Nevertheless, although
abolishing the IRS seems drastic as a sound bite, dividing the IRS into two or three new
agencies—one of which would focus on revenue raising under a new name—has its
merits. Arguably, the “Internal Revenue Service” brand has been substantially
compromised in the eyes of at least a plurality of the taxpaying public. At the risk of
giving bragging rights to demagogues, dividing the IRS into two or three new agencies
might give the revenue collection arm a fresh start. With that fresh start, perhaps
Congress might be persuaded to “restore” funding to those new agencies.
Whether cast as spinning off certain programs and functions or dividing the IRS
outright, either approach to restructuring the IRS would likely give rise to interagency
coordination problems. Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi stress the importance of interagency
coordination in an age where “so many domains of social and economic regulation now
seen populated by numerous agencies, which—to satisfy their missions—must work
165
together cooperatively or live side by side compatibly.”
Nevertheless, potential
interagency coordination issues are not without remedy. Whatever combination of
agencies emerges from reorganizing the IRS can deliberately pursue both formal
interagency agreements and informal interagency consultations, can coordinate
policymaking (much as the IRS, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health
and Human Services do presently in the ERISA and Affordable Care Act contexts), and
can seek the assistance of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to prevent
166
coordination problems.
Where there’s a will, there’s a way to minimize interagency
coordination challenges.
V.
CONCLUSION
The IRS is in perilous shape at the moment, and its condition is largely
Congress’s fault. Congress has burdened the IRS with too many secondary social welfare
and regulatory programs, most of which have little to no relation to the IRS’s primary
mission: collecting taxes. The IRS has made its own share of errors, but so do we all
when given responsibilities for which we are unprepared and ill-suited.
The secondary functions assigned by Congress to the IRS divert too many
resources from the IRS’s core mission. The IRS and its personnel lack the expertise to
assess the political consequences of many of the administrative decisions the IRS must
make on a day-to-day basis. Politically-controversial decisions upset taxpayers, give rise
to skepticism regarding the fairness and legitimacy of the tax system, and thus imperil tax
compliance.
Finding a way to separate some of the largest and most politically fraught nonrevenue raising functions from the IRS, such as exempt status determinations or health
policy administration, would allow the IRS to avoid such political turmoil and return its
focus to its core expertise. At the very least, the idea is worth considering.
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